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COMMENTS
JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Independent supervision and review of judicial conduct and reappoint-
ment qualifications are generally considered desirable. Almost all states
currently utilize some form of tenure council or commission to oversee
the activities of their judges. The District of Columbia Commission on
Judicial Disabilities and Tenure, first established in 1971, regulates the
behavior of local judges. Since the approval of the District of Columbia
Charter, the Tenure Commission also figures prominently in the reap-
pointment of the District's judges.
The Tenure Commission has been rather successful in expediting
disciplinary matters and reappointments. But experience has also ex-
posed some latent deficiencies in the structure and operation of the
Tenure Commission which require careful attention.
Judge Charles W. Halleck resigned from his position on the District of
Columbia Superior Court effective July 29, 1977 to return to private
practice. Actually Judge Halleck was the first public fatality of the
relatively new reappointment procedure for judges in the District of
Columbia courts established by Congress under the District of Columbia
Home Rule Act.' Although the District of Columbia Commission on
Judicial Disabilities and Tenure approved Judge Halleck's candidacy by
rating him qualified, 2 a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, also
conducted by the Tenure Commission, undoubtedly affected his unsuc-
cessful reappointment attempt.
Recently, most of Judge Halleck's challenges to the Commission's
authority and practices were rejected. Judge Halleck filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia on October 26,
1976 for declaratory and injunctive relief.3 He requested the court to find
1. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act
(Home Rule Act), Pub. L. No. 93-198, §§ 431-34, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). There is some
speculation that former Superior Court Judge Harry T. Alexander elected to resign several
months after declaring his candidacy for reappointment rather than complete the evalua-
tion initiated by the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure.
Wash. Post, October 27, 1976, § A, at 4, col. 3.
2. The procedures and standards employed by the Tenure Commission are discussed
at text accompanying notes 106-17 infra.
3. Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977).
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certain portions of the Act unconstitutional, declare the Commission's
evaluation of his fitness for duty invalid, and enjoin the Commission's
pending disciplinary action.
Judge Thomsen, a federal judge for the District of Maryland was
designated by Chief Justice Burger to hear the action filed by Judge
Halleck after all the members of the District Court for the District of
Columbia disqualified themselves. 4 Judge Thomsen affirmed the Tenure
Commission's actions and denied Judge Halleck's requests.
Despite the apparent constitutional validity of the Tenure Commis-
sion's structure and operation, serious problems persist. The precise
scope of the Commission's power is unclear; the criteria used to evaluate
a judge's conduct are rather subjective; and, most critical in Judge
Halleck's case, the Commission cannot assure absolute confidentiality in
either its reappointment or disciplinary proceedings.
Under Judge Thomsen's ruling, of course, the absence of strict secre-
cy will not invalidate the proceedings. In his opinion, Judge Thomsen
stated that the Commission did not violate the statutory provison for
confidentiality when its Special Counsel failed to require all individuals
contacted during the disciplinary investigation to affirm they would not
reveal they had been contacted by the Commission.5 Realistically, how-
ever, the Commission's inability to control the flow of information
concerning its investigations and hearings might continue to jeopardize 6
the reappointment of other judges or impair the effectiveness of the
Commission's disciplinary and involuntary retirement functions. Be-
cause this problem involves competing interests, it is unclear whether it
can ever be resolved satisfactorily.
To assess the potential impact of these weaknesses adequately, this
article will summarize both the alternative means of supervising judicial
misconduct and the development of tenure commissions throughout the
United States. It will also review the origins and functions of the Dis-
trict's Tenure Commission, assess the Commission's performance and
potential, and examine Judge Halleck's candidacy for reappointment and
the Commission's subsequent disciplinary action.
I. A PROFILE OF JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSIONS
Few would dispute that regulation of improper judicial conduct is
necessary to maintain high standards for the administration of justice 7
4. Id. at 1232.
5. Id. at 1243.
6. See notes 167-89 & accompanying text infra.
7. Davis, The Chandler Incident and Problems of Judicial Removal, 19 STAN. L. REV.
[Vol. 27:543
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and nurture public confidence in the judiciary.8 Simultaneously, how-
ever, the independence of the judiciary must be protected. 9 Therefore,
any acceptable scheme for imposing sanctions must fashion a "balance
. . .that removes the obstacles to a justified removal while maintaining
adequate safeguards to prevent unnecessary attacks on the judiciary.'"'
The traditional methods for removing judges-impeachment, address,
concurrent resolution, and recall'-have been subject to valid criticism.
448, 453 (1967); Winter, Judging the Judges-The Techniques of Judicial Discipline, 41
Miss. L. J. 1, 9 (1970).
8. "It is the thesis here that the principal policy objective of a procedure for dealing
with judicial misconduct as such ...is to insure society's confidence in the formal
system of dispute-resolution." Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and How Four States
Deal With It, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 151, 153 (1970). See also W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO
JUDGES THE JUDGES 9 (1971); The Discipline and Removal of Judges, 28 REC. B. A. CITY
N.Y. 377, 379 (1973); Comment, The Procedures of Judicial Discipline, 59 MARQ. L. REV.
190, 208-09 (1976).
9. Winter, supra note 7, at 9.
A major justification for limiting scrutiny of the judiciary for purposes of disci-
pline or removal is the need to preserve judicial independence. Although "judi-
cial independence" has two meanings, in this context it does not refer to the
independence of the judiciary as an institution from control by other branches of
government, but to the right of the individual judge to exercise his office within
his view of the law, without fear of repercussions merely because of those views.
... .It is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either
civil suit or discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous . . . . An
honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence require-
ment, might become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to
discipline based merely upon the inferences to be drawn from an erroneous
decision.
Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and Discipline of Judges,
41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 149, 150-51 (1966).
Actually, both aspects of judicial independence are involved. If either the legislative or
executive branch plays a large role in tenure decisions, there is the possibility the judiciary
will be subordinated to another branch. Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct, supra note 8, at
153 (quoting Illinois Supreme Court Justice Schaefer in Cusack v. Howlett, 44 111. 2d. 233,
237, 254 N.E.2d 506, 508 (1969)).
As a corollary to this analysis, one could conclude that an evaluation of judicial
performance which relies on an individual's appellate reversal rate would be unsatisfac-
tory: "[T]he feasibility of using the [reversal] records as a standard of performance is
doubtful. Some less respected judges are seldom reversed, because of their slavish
adherence to prior law. Good judges, however, often find themselves reversed for
attempting new approaches." Note, supra, at 152.
10. Davis, supra note 7, at 454.
I1. Impeachment may be analogized to an indictment in the lower house of the state
legislature followed by a trial in the upper house. Address involves a formal demand from
the state legislature to the governor requesting the removal of a judge. Concurrent
resolution is quite similar. If the required percentage of both legislative houses petition the
governor to remove a judge, he must comply. Lastly, some states provide for removal
through a recall vote: if a sufficient number of qualified voters petition for a recall, a
special election is conducted. Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct, supra note 8, at 153 n.7.
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Apparently none of the mechanisms is invoked very often.12 Since the
legislature is the protagonist in three of these scenarios, partisan politics
might play a substantial role. 13 Impeachment, available in forty-six states
as of 1970, is also cited for the time and funds required to complete the
process 14 and its general ineffectiveness. 5 Furthermore these plans pro-
vide little flexibility to select sanctions appropriate to the individual
conduct involved. 16
Perhaps in response to the difficulties inherent in these other systems,
many states during the past several years have created a new apparatus,
the tenure commission, to supplement the older forms. 17 The general
reaction to these innovations has been favorable and the experiences
encouraging. 18
At this juncture, tenure and disability mechanisms must be distin-
guished from merit selection devices. Although both are intended to
improve the quality of the bench, the scope of each agency is quite
different. A judicial selection procedure should guarantee the candi-
date's professional qualifications at the time of his appointment. On the
other hand, a tenure mechanism assures the expeditious discipline or
retirement of judges who engage in misconduct or develop disabilities
while in office.19
Specific features of the different disciplinary devices vary greatly
between jurisdictions. 20 Usually, however, the tenure and disability
12. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 13 (1971); Braithwaite, Judicial Mis-
conduct supra note 8, at 153-54. In the federal judiciary system, in which impeachment
has been the exclusive, and perhaps the only, constitutional method of removal (U.S.
CONST. art. 2, § 4), 56 judges have been investigated in the history of the nation. Eight of
these judges were impeached, eight were censured, and seventeen resigned. J. BORKIN,
THE CORRUPT JUDGE, 213-58 (1962). The campaign to impeach Justice William 0. Douglas
occurred after the publication of Mr. Borkin's book.
13. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 9 (1971).
14. Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct, supra note 8, at 154.
15. Comment, supra note 8, at 195-97.
16. 54 N.C.L. REV. 1074, 1079 (1976).
17. According to one tabulation, between 1960 and 1974, approximately 36 juris-
dictions implemented a special commission to handle judicial disciplinary matters. Frank-
el, Who Judges the Judges?, TRIAL, Jan./Feb. 1975, at 52. The District of Columbia
Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure reported that by 1976, 41 states, in
addition to the District, had commission plans. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISABILITIES AND TENURE (April 1975-September
1976), at 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT I].
18. See Frankel, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 8; Note, Discipline of Judges in
Maryland, 34 MD. L. REV. 612 (1974); 54 N.C.L. REV. 1074 (1976).
19. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 11 (1971).
20. For a summary of each program in existence during 1972, including the derivation
and scope of the disciplinary power, the composition of the agency, procedures, sanc-
tions, and recent court decisions, see NATIONAL CONFERENCES OF JUDICIAL DISABILITIES
[Vol. 27:543
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forum receives complaints directed against any judge within its juris-
diction. The commission will investigate the charge to determine whether
it should be dismissed or if formal proceedings should be instituted. If
the panel members conclude that there is some basis for the allegation,
the judge will be informed and given an opportunity to make an informal
reply. Some judges prefer to retire or resign at this stage. If the judge's
response is satisfactory, the board will close the case; if not, the commis-
sion will hold a hearing and issue its decision.
2
'
Regardless of the particular form adopted by each state, certain ele-
ments seem especially desirable, if not compulsory. Adequate publicity,
a heterogeneous commission membership, a full-time administrative
staff, established behaviorial standards and commission procedures, a
wide scope of commission authority, and confidential proceedings are
items which should be incorporated into most judicial tenure systems.
Since these agencies rely heavily on input from the bar and private
individuals, the commission must be accessible. 22 To achieve this goal,
the public must be aware of the commission and its functions. Similarly,
information reflecting the commission's activities for each year should
be readily available. Otherwise it will be impossible to assess the
commission's work accurately and the public might suspect that the
commission is ineffective. 23 Additionally, unless informal procedures for
AND REMOVAL COMMISSIONS, JUDICIAL DISABILITIES AND REMOVAL COMMISSIONS,
COURTS AND PROCEDURES (1972) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CONFERENCES].
21. Most states have created independent commissions which conduct investigations
and hearings or delegate this power to special masters but can only recommend action to
the state supreme court which selects the proper sanction. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 22.30.070; CAL. CONST. art. 6, §§ 8, 18; FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 17A, para. 3; IDAHO CODE
§§ 1-2101 to 2104 (Supp. 1977); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 25; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 30; N.M.
CONST. art VI, § 32; PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. 5, § l-a; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 49-7a-38 (Supp. 1975). Other states vest the entire process in the judiciary. See, e.g.,
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:IB-2 to 1B-1 I (West Supp. 1977); N.Y.
CONST. art. 6, § 22b.
22. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 94 (1971); Winter, supra note 7, at 12.
23. Gasperini, Anderson & McGinley, Judicial Removal in New York: A New Look, 40
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 24 (1971). Most commissions' proceedings are confidential to a
certain degree and usually no identities are revealed in the yearly report. Unfortunately,
the publication of statistics regarding the number of complaints and their disposition might
place every retirement or resignation in doubt; often the public will have no way of
knowing whether a specific retirement or resignation was "legitimate" or the result of
commission activity. Nevertheless, some analysis of a commission's performance is
necessary to demonstrate its utility; the possibility that people will speculate over the
departure of certain judges should not inhibit the circulation of this data. Moreover, in
most jurisdictions the proceedings lose their confidential nature once the Commission
files a recommendation with the state supreme court. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 17A;
IDAHO CODE § 1-2103 (Supp. 1976); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 25(D); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32;
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23(3)(d); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37.
1978]
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filing complaints exist, individuals will be deterred from participating. 24
The membership of judges, lawyers, and laymen on the commission
seems obligatory. 25 The public, which has a definite interest in the
judiciary and the commission's operation, should be represented. Be-
cause of their close contact with the court system, judges and attorneys
would contribute invaluable knowledge to any deliberations. 26 More-
over, a heterogeneous membership would safeguard a commission's
autonomy and impartiality since all members would not be subject to the
same external pressures.
27
For a balanced perspective, perhaps each group should be represented
equally on the commission. Some writers, however, favor proposals in
which judges constitute a majority of the commissioners. Apparently
there is some apprehension that unless judges are in the majority, inap-
propriate standards of conduct might be employed 28 which may under-
mine the independence of the judiciary. 29
But the commentators who advocate the position that tenure commis-
sions should have a majority of judges offer no evidence to support their
fears.30 One might well doubt the commission's zeal and ability to regu-
late judicial conduct if most of its members are judges. 3' In any event,
several jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, do not provide
for a predomination of judges on the tenure commission.3 2
A permanent full-time staff to assist the commissioners is necessary to
promote the plan's effectiveness. These employees handle the daily
24. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 163 (1971).
25. This discussion is not pertinent in jurisdictions in which the disciplinary authority is
held solely by the judiciary, such as New Jersey or Wisconsin. However, a disciplinary
tribunal composed entirely of judges is less desirable, since critics could easily, and
perhaps unfairly, question the impartiality of the commission's members.
26. Cady, Court Modernization: Retrospective, Prospective and Perspective, 6 SUF-
FOLK L. REV. 815, 832, 834 (1972).
27. Frankel, Judicial Ethics and Discipline of the 1970's, 54 JUDICATURE 18, 19 (1970);
Note, supra note 9, at 183.
28. See Note, supra note 9, at 183. In discussing the California Judicial Qualifications
Commission, the author asserts: "More important, the Commission's composition tends
to insure that the standards applied are related to expectations of how judges should
behave. The majority of its members are judges, able to present a knowledgeable picture
to the other members of what standards may reasonably be applied to the judiciary." Id.
29. Winter, supra note 7, at 11.
30. See Winter, supra note 7; Note, supra note 9.
31. See Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct, supra note 8, at 153 (quoting Illinois Su-
preme Court Justice Schaefer in Cusack v. Howlett, 44 II1. 2d 233, 240, 254 N.E.2d 506,
509 (1969)); Comment, supra note 8, at 209.
32. Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, Texas, and
Utah are among the states which do not have a majority of judges on their judicial
disciplinary commissions. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17.
[Vol. 27:543
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administrative work and act as a liasion between the commission and the
public. 33
An effective program also requires continuity; procedures and ethical
standards are mandated. 34 Procedural rules would facilitate the disposi-
tion of a complaint and foster consistent treatment of individual cases.
Meanwhile, behavioral guidelines would furnish a model of proper judi-
cial conduct.
The formulation of published standards serves many additional pur-
poses. First, a judge would know what principles the commission will
use to evaluate his behavior. Second, attorneys and potential witnesses
will be aware of the criteria necessary to sustain a complaint. 35 Third,
established criteria would aid the commission in adjudicating each case;
once standards have been adopted, the commissioners' function would
be limited to determining whether an individual has violated the rules of
conduct and, if so, imposing an appropriate penalty. 36
Judicial misconduct falls into several categories which range from
felony convictions to courtroom discourtesy. 37 The majority of cases,
however, involve "habitual tardiness, short hours, long vacations, and
extreme rudeness to lawyers, litigants, and witnesses . ".. 38 Much of
this misconduct probably does not warrant removal; nonetheless, it
should not be condoned. 39 Therefore a tenure commission should have
33. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 163 (1971); Winter, supra note 7, at-12;
Comment, supra note 8, at 209.
34. Winter, supra note 7, at 11-12.
35. It is important that standards of judicial misconduct be set, and be known by
three classes of persons. Of course, judges should know by what standards their
conduct will be judged, both in fairness to them and to reduce the required
number of disciplinary proceedings. Witnesses at disciplinary proceedings who
could be adversely affected in the event of the judge's return to the bench might
be more willing to testify if they were aware of standards of conduct. Attorneys,
also, should know which acts of judicial misconduct are proscribed, so that they
will not incur a judge's resentment for making an unactionable complaint.
Note, supra note 9, at 195.
36. Martineau, Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410,
417; Note, supra note 18, at 619. Martineau views the ABA's Code of Judicial Conduct as
supplying definite and enforceable ethical criteria. Martineau, supra, at 418-19.
37. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 161 (1971).
An analysis of the provisions of the various states that have one or the other
[judicial courts or commissions on tenure] reveals that the normal bases for
disciplinary action include willful neglect of duty, persistent and willful failure to
perform the duties of the court, intemperate use of alcohol or drugs, conviction of
a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, persistent violation of judicial
ethics, and gross impartiality on the court.
Winter, supra note 7, at 11.
38. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 5 (1971).
39. "Judicial bad manners is a critical problem which renders a disciplinary technique
19781
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sufficient flexibility to deal with the varying degrees of potential miscon-
duct. Ideally, the commission should be empowered to issue informal,
private reprimands as well as order public censures and removals.'
Perhaps the key to a tenure system's potential effectiveness, however,
is the confidentiality of the proceedings. The parties must be promised
some degree of anonymity. Otherwise, attorneys and litigants, fearing
reprisals from the judge, will hesitate to submit complaints or participate
as witnesses in commission proceedings. 41 The damaging effect of this
attitude on the commission's operations is readily apparent. To alleviate
this apprehension, communications with the commission should be
privileged. 42
A confidentiality rule would accomplish other valuable goals. It would
curtail the circulation of frivolous, unproven, and false accusations,43
prompt some judges to acknowledge any charges voluntarily, 44 contrib-
ute to the use of informal disciplinary methods for minor infractions, 45
and allow judges to resign or retire without facing an embarrassing
inquiry .46
Some observers might well object to secret proceedings and question
whether the Commissioners are being thorough or effective. 47 Others
vital. Although circumstances will not normally permit or justify removal, the public
needs a tool to assert the standards of decency." Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Re-
moval, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1117, 1123 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
40. Many commentators support this position. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE
JUDGES 161 (1971); NATIONAL CONFERENCES, supra note 20, at xviii; Frankel, supra note
39, at 1129-30.
A study of commission actions in one state indicated that removals usually occur when
"conviction of a felony, gross misconduct outside the courthouse, or incompetence in
performing judicial duties" is involved. Note, supra note 18, at 626. Conversely, censure
is ordinarily invoked when "isolated lapses of personal or professional conduct and lack
of proper judicial temperament" exist. Id. at 628. From this survey, the author concluded:
It is very difficult to mark the boundary between conduct meriting removal and
conduct meriting censure. The line lies more in the degree of misconduct, rather
than its nature, although there is a greater tendency to remove a judge for criminal
actions or conduct directly affecting the performance of judicial duties.
Id. at 632.
41. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 163 (1971); 0. PHILLIPS & P. McCoY,
CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 212 (1952).
42. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEXAS L.
REV. 629, 712-13 (1972).
43. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 94, 162 (1971).
44. Aischuler, supra note 42, at 713.
45. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES 162 (1971).
46. Id. at 161; Alschuler, supra note 42, at 713; Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct,
supra note 8, at 168.
47. Alschuler, supra note 42, at 708-13. The author raised several possible exceptions
to this policy but concluded the benefits derived from a confidential proceeding outweigh
the public's right of access to this information. Id.
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believe the record should be opened once the commission proposes
punishment.48 Despite this disagreement, it is clear that without some
assurance to complainants, witnesses, lawyers, and judges that their
identities will remain undisclosed whenever possible, the commission
will not receive the cooperation necessary to fulfill its role in improving
the caliber of the judiciary.
II. THE FIRST DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION
ON JUDICIAL DISABILITIES AND TENURE
Congress established the original District of Columbia Commission on
Judicial Disabilities and Tenure when it enacted the District of Columbia
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. 49 This legislation
evolved from a proposal, designated as the District of Columbia Court
Reorganization Act of 1969, submitted by then Attorney General John
Mitchell on July 11, 1969, and introduced as S. 2601.50 The recom-
mendation specifically provided for a District of Columbia Commission
on Disabilities and Tenure." At the same time, the House of Representa-
tives was considering legislation, H.R. 16196, which encompassed many
aspects of S. 2601 and a revision of the District's criminal procedurei 2
According to the House Report which accompanied H.R. 16196:
The purpose of this bill is to give to the people of Washington,
its citizens and those temporarily sojourning here, as well as the
millions of visitors who come here annually, some measure of
surcease from the evergrowing criminal element which too long,
outrageously and indefensibly, has been a threat to life, limb
and property in the District of Columbia. 3
48. Note, supra note 18, at 632; see note 23 supra. The practice of California's Judicial
Qualifications Commission reflects this philosophy. W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE
JUDGES 94 (1971).
49. Pub. L. No. 91-358, §§ 111-11-1521 to 111-11-1530, 84 Stat. 473 (codified at D.C.
Code §§ 11-1521 to 1530 (1973) (amended 1975)). Under the United States Constitution,
Congress has plenary legislative power for the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8.
50. Holloman, The Judicial Reform Act: History, Analysis and Comment, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 128, 139 (1970).
51. Id. Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst later iterated the Nixon adminis-
tration's support for a tenure commission when he spoke at a hearing conducted by the
Senate's District of Columbia Committee and the Judicial Subcommittee on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery. Id.
52. H.R. 16196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
53. H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 91-
907]. Both the Senate Report on S. 2601 and the House Report on H.R. 16196 reflected
extreme concern over the District's rising crime rate and the inability of the existing court
system to cope with the situation. H.R. REP. 91-907, supra, at 3-4, 14-22; S. REP. No. 405,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 91-405].
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Although these bills were aimed primarily at adjusting the jurisdiction of
the local courts, improving court management, and modifying the Dis-
trict's criminal procedures,5 4 regulation of judicial misconduct was re-
garded as a critical element in the scheme. 55
In explaining the principal features of S. 2601, the Senate Committee
recognized that techniques of judicial selection are imperfect and some
judges become unfit for office during their tenure. 6 The Committee also
acknowledged that the contemporary provision for the removal of local
judges was inadequate.5 7 Under the existing statute, removal of judges
sitting on the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions or the
Court of Appeals could only be effected in accordance with the constitu-
tional requisites applicable to federal judges.58 Therefore, aside from a
ten year tenure, District of Columbia judges held office during good
behavior, 9 but could be removed through impeachment and conviction
of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 6° Essential-
ly then, the creation of a tenure commission was viewed as one method
to promote judicial competence. 61
54. H.R. REP. 91-907, supra note 53, at 23-25, 42-122. Preceding the Court Reform Act,
the federal courts for the District of Columbia had original and appellate jurisdiction,
which was either exclusive or concurrent, over many local matters. Pub. L. No. 88-241, §§
11-321, 11-521, 11-522, and 11-523, 77 Stat. 479, 482-83 (1963). In its report the Senate
Committee on the District of Columbia noted it:
was mindful of the anomoly inherent in burdening a Federal district court with
sole general jurisdiction over the full panoply of local legal matters. The burden is
acute in the District of Columbia, the seat of the Federal Government, where, in
the absence of inordinately crowded dockets (both civil and criminal), a substan-
tial and greater quantum of genuinely Federal litigation might best and conven-
iently be brought. Yet, at present the median time for civil jury trial in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia is nearly double the median for Federal
district courts nationwide. In recent years as many as 12 out of 14 judges of the
Federal court in the National Capital have been assigned full time to the trial of
local felony offenses.
S. REP. 91-405, supra note 53, at 3. As finally passed, S. 2601 shifted jurisdiction over
local litigation to the District of Columbia Superior Court and Court of Appeals. D.C.
Code §§ 11-721, 11-921 to 923 (1973) The jurisdiction of the federal courts in the District
now accords with that of other United States courts in the country.,Id. §§ 11-301 to 503.
55. H.R. REP. 91-907, supra note 53, at 38-39.
56. S. REP. 91-405, supra note 53, at 10.
57. Id. at 11.
58. See Pub. L. No. 88-241, §§ 11-902(f), 77 Stat. 487 (1963).
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
60. Id., art. II, § 4.
61. H.R. REP. 91-907, supra note 53, at 39; S. REP. 91-405, supra note 53, at 8, 25-26.
The Senate Committee commented:
To maintain public confidence in the courts and to assure a mechanism to deal
with unfit judges, there is a need for the creation of a commission to effect the
removal of unfit judges and the retirement of those who are disabled. Such a
commission is an essential ingredient of a sound court structure.
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S. 2601, popularly known as the Court Reform Act, was finally ap-
proved by both houses and became effective February 11, 1971.62
Composed of five members and three alternates, 63 the Commission was
given the authority "to suspend, retire, or remove a judge of a District of
Columbia court" pursuant to the standards and procedures enunciated in
the Act, 4 ultimately subject to judicial review by a special court
convened by the Chief Justice of the United States. 65
The first Tenure Commission existed for almost four years. In that
period, it published one set of rules and regulations, 66 received approxi-
mately forty-nine complaints, and publicly censured one judge. 67 Except
to announce the public censure, the first Commission never released any
information regarding its activities. 68 Since the Commission's files are
confidential, 69 there is little indication how the remaining forty-eight
complaints were dispatched. 70 As noted earlier, failure to provide any
material relating to a tenure commission's work casts significant doubt
on its credibility and competence. Without an accounting, the
Id. at 10. The Committee found considerable precedent for a tenure commission in other
jurisdictions which had experimented with alternative disciplinary systems, and noted
their general success. Id. at 10-11.
As voted out of committee, S. 2601 proposed an advisory committee on judicial
selection whose members would recommend candidates for judicial vacancies. 116 CONG.
REC. 8925-26 (1970). This section was intended to promote merit selection of judges. S.
REP. 91-405, supra note 53, at 8, 26-27. Originally S. 2601 also contemplated an initial four
year trial period followed by good behavior tenure if the judge were reconfirmed. 116
CONG. REC. 8925 (1970). See also S. REP. 91-405, supra note 53, at 8, 25-26. The House
Committee on the District of Columbia objected to both plans and neither section was
included in the final bill. H.R. REP. 91-907, supra note 53, at 38-39.
62. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. For a synopsis of the bill's history in Congress, see 1970 D.C.
Code Legis. & Admin. Serv. 398.
63. D.C. Code § 11-1522 (1973) (amended 1973).
64. Id. § 11-1521.
65. Id. § 11-1529. The special court's scope of review is similar to that employed by an
appellate court examining agency action.
66. 17 D.C. Reg. 22,694 (May 3, 1971). In the Court Reform Act, Congress granted
rule-making authority to the Commission. D.C. Code § 11-1525 (1973) (amended 1973).
The regulations which the Commission promulgated determined Commission procedures
for investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating all complaints.
67. Phone conversations with Cathaee Hudgins, Executive Assistant to the current
Commission (Sept. 12, 15 & 16, 1977).
68. The information presented here was collated by Ms. Hudgins from records main-
tained by the previous Commission.
69. D.C. Code § 11-1528 (1973) (amended 1973).
70. The one complaint which resulted in formal action by the Commission involved
allegations that a judge's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and
detrimental to the judicial office. The Commission's investigation concentrated on the
transcripts of several cases heard by the respondent judge between February 19, 1971, and
August 12, 1971. Many of the judge's comments demonstrated extreme discourtesy to
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strength of the Commission's performance from 1971 to 1974 cannot be
determined.7
III. HOME RULE AND THE DISTRICT'S TENURE COMMISSION
The Tenure Commission was reconstituted under the District of Col-
umbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act.72 Ac-
cording to the "Statement of Purposes" included in the legislation, the
Act was intended to grant the District many of the powers and respon-
sibilities normally associated with a state. 73 This attitude, and the
witnesses, litigants, and attorneys, interference with the judicial process, criticism of
other judges, and impatience with the administration of justice. The Commission
concluded that the judge's actions warranted public censure because the evidence re-
flected a disregard for both the judicial standards enunciated by the courts and the Canons
of Judicial Ethics. In re Harry T. Alexander, Formal Case No. 1-71 at 27-30 (Commission
on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure, February 14, 1972).
In determining that the judge's behavior did not justify a harsher penalty, the Commis-
sioners cited certain mitigating circumstances:
The Commission recognizes that before going on the Bench, Judge Alexander
rendered important service as a member of the Bar, and that since going on the
Bench, in other instances not here involved, he has rendered conscientious and
effective judicial service. We do not believe, therefore, that his conduct as
detailed herein is such as to require us to proceed beyond the issuance of a public
censure.
Id. at 30.
71. See note 23 & accompanying text supra. In its opinion and order regarding Judge
Alexander, the Commission gave some indication of its informal method for disposing of
minor complaints; apparently, private admonitions were issued on several occasions
during the Commission's first year. The opinion also suggested that repeated offenses
would be handled more severely:
The conduct of some other judges in our Superior Court has been the subject of
complaints which also alleged intemperate and injudicial conduct. These com-
plaints have been and are presently the subject of investigation and, in some
cases, warnings by the Commission have been issued to the judge concerned.
Judge Alexander, however, has exhibited unacceptable conduct extending over
such a long period of time that a private resolution of the present complaint is
deemed inappropriate.
In re Alexander, Formal Case No. 1-71 at 30.
Since no other judges received a public reproval, one might infer that the informal
approach was remarkably effective. This barometer, however, might prove inaccurate,
since the opinion reflected only the Commission's position as it entered its second year
and it is possible that the policy was modified over the next three years. Without access to
more detailed statistics or the files, however, this assumption cannot be verified or
refuted.
72. Pub. L. No. 93-198, §§ 431(d)-(g), 432-433, 87 Stat. 774 (1973). The Home Rule
Act was signed by President Nixon on December 24, 1973, but Title IV regarding the
judiciary did not take effect until January 2, 1975, after approval by the District of
Columbia voters in a charter referendum. Id. § 771(c).
73. The Statement of Purposes noted in pertinent part:
[T]he intent of Congress is to delegate certain legislative powers to the govern-
ment of the District of Columbia; authorize the election of certain local officials
by the registered qualified electors in the District of Columbia; grant to the
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continuing congressional interest in an independent local judiciary, were
manifested in the decision to establish a Judicial Nomination Commis-
sion 74 and to retain the Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure. 75
inhabitants of the District of Columbia powers of local self-government; to
modernize, reorganize, and otherwise improve the governmental structure of the
District of Columbia; and, to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the
constitutional mandate, relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essen-
tially local District matters.
Id. § 102(a).
74. Prior to the Home Rule Act, all judges of the District of Columbia courts were
nominated by the President and appointed with Senate approval. D.C. Code § I1-
1501(a) (1973). After the enactment of the Court Reform Act, see note 62 supra, the
United States Attorney General commissioned the ABA's Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary to render advisory evaluations of nominees to the District of Columbia bench.
ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 4.
The Judicial Nomination Commission is now empowered to select candidates to fill
impending or existing vacancies. The seven members are required to submit a list of three
nominees to the President for appointment upon the advice and consent of the Senate. If
the President does not select any of the candidates suggested by the Nomination Commis-
sion within sixty days, the Commissioners will nominate one of the persons on the roster,
again subject to Senate approval. Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 434(d), 87 Stat.
774 (1973).
The history of these provisions is quite interesting. Earlier versions of both the House
and Senate bills conferred the appointment power on the mayor, contingent upon Senate
or City Council approval. COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SELF-GOVERNMENT & GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZA-
TION ACT, S. 1435, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 423, 515 (1973).
Some Congressmen, who favored presidential appointment, feared that judicial inde-
pendence would be threatened if local officials were given this authority:
The independence built into the present system could be destroyed by putting the
local judiciary in a position of dependence-for reappointment and even possibly
for adequate funding-on the very same officials they have a legal responsibility
to oversee. I much prefer the present system which provides great distance in the
appointive process between the selecting and confirming entities on the one hand
and the judges and decisions they have to render on the other.
119 CONG. REC. 33377 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Harsha). For further comments of Rep.
Harsha, see 119 CONG. REc. 33635-36 (1973).
Although this position eventually prevailed, one might well question its logic. Rep.
Harsha's conclusion is premised on the comparison he made between the District and
other United States cities. Id. at 33377. It might, however, be more apt to follow
Representative Mann's view: "Any analogy with the judicial appointment process opera-
tive in other municipalities would not be appropriate inasmuch as the local court system in
the District of Columbia is clearly more analogous to a [s]tate court structure than to a
municipal court structure .. " Id. at 33388.
All appointed judges are potentially subject to political pressures and it is not rea-
sonable to assume that the District's judges will be any more susceptible to these influ-
ences, especially when the appointment and reappointment procedures give the executive
such limited discretion. If one equates the District's court structure with those of the
different states, the federal government's participation in the appointment of non-federal
judges is anomalous and unjustified. Despite this controversy over which executive
should nominate the judges, it is clear that merit selection was a prime motive for the
creation of the Judicial Nomination Commission. Id. at 42037-38.
75. To further insulate the judiciary, the Home Rule Act prohibits the City Council
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The former Tenure Commission had five members: three appointed by
the President, one by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia and
one by the Chief Judge of the District Court for the District of Columbia.
Only three of the appointees were required to be District residents.7 6
In comparison, the new Tenure Commission has seven members who
serve staggered terms and are compensated for their services at a GS-18
rate.77 Of the seven members, one is appointed by the President of the
United States, two by the Board of Governors for the District of Colum-
bia Bar, two by the mayor, one by the City Council, and one by the Chief
Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
All members serve for six years, except the presidential appointee who
only has a five year tenure. The person selected by the Chief Judge must
be a retired or active federal judge and will not receive any additional
compensation. All members must be United States citizens. At least two
of the Commissioners, and possibly four, will be laypersons. Appointees
who are attorneys must satisfy the qualifications set for District of
Columbia judges. Moreover, with the exception of the member desig-
nated by the Chief Judge of the district court, Commission members
cannot be employed by the District of Columbia government, in an
executive or military agency, or in the legislative or judicial branch of the
federal government. 78
The impact of the home rule philosophy is immediately noticeable.
Presidential influence over the Tenure Commission is greatly diminished
since the President selects only one Commissioner. Meanwhile local
interests receive greater representation. The Judicial Nomination and
Tenure Commissions, which share primary responsibility for insuring a
highly qualified and reputable bench, are comprised of District residents
only. Moreover, a majority of the Commissioners are appointed by local
parties.
Under the Home Rule Act, the Commission retained its former author-
ity but was also assigned the task of evaluating the performance of
judges seeking reappointment. 79 The statutory standards for imposing
from amending sections of the Charter which affect the judges, Pub. L. No. 93-198,
§ 303(a), 87 Stat. 774 (1973), or altering any portion of title I I of the D.C. Code which
pertains to the organization, administration, and jurisdiction of the local courts. Id.
§ 602(a)(4). These safeguards should operate in conjunction to guarantee a very high
degree of judicial integrity and independence.
76. D.C. Code § 11-1522 (1973). The old Commission also had three alternates, selected
respectively by the President, Commissioner, and Chief Judge. Id.
77. Home Rule Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, §§ 431(d)-(f), 434 (a)-(c), 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
78. Id. §§ 431(e)(l)(C). Similar requirements exist regarding the judicial Nomination
Commission. See id. § 434.
79. Id. §§ 432, 433(c). For further discussion of the reappointment functions, see
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sanctions or involuntary retirement are identical to those established by
the Court Reform Act in 1970.80 The grounds for removal are conviction
of a felony"' or other behavior which the Commissioners have deter-
mined constitutes: "(A) willful misconduct in office, (B) willful and
persistent failure to perform judicial duties, or (C) any other conduct
which is prejudicial to the administration of justice or which brings the
judicial office into disrepute." 82 Involuntary retirement is mandated
once the Commission concludes that a physical or mental disability is
impairing a judge's performance.83
Since both removal and involuntary retirement orders are subject to
judicial review by a special court, 84 no judge will be disciplined or retired
until either the Commission's ruling is affirmed or the time for filing an
appeal has lapsed. Nevertheless, the Commission is obligated to suspend
a judge pending the final judgment of a felony conviction or court review
of the Commission's action.85 Similarly, until all appeals have been
completed, the Commissioners must suspend any judge for whom they
have filed an involuntary retirement order.8 6 Lastly, the Commissioners
text accompanying notes 106-23 infra.
The legislative history of the Home Rule Act contains little discussion of the Commis-
sion's existing disciplinary authority. Apparently, Congress readily accepted this function
and there was no need for renewed debate. One Congressman, however, commented
favorably on the Tenure Commission's disciplinary role:
A momentous contribution of the Court Reorganization Act of 1970 was the
establishment of the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and
Tenure. The Tenure Commission acts as guardian of the integrity and propriety of
the local bench with such basic functions as oversight, persuasion, and formal
determination-in connection with the ultimate duties of removal and involuntary
retirement.
119 CONG. REC. 33388 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Mann).
80. Compare D.C. Code § 11-1526 (1973) with Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 432, 87 Stat. 774
(1973).
81. Id. § 432(a)(1).
82. Id. § 432(a)(2). For an analysis of these standards, see text accompanying notes
156-61 infra.
83. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 432(b), 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
84. D.C. Code § 11-1529 (1973). The provision for judicial review was actually imple-
mented under the Court Reform Act, and remains valid since § 718(a) of the Home Rule
Act retains all portions of the 1970 legislation which are compatible with the later Act. The
Commission has construed this section to include procedural aspects outlined in § 11-1527,
confidentiality requirements set forth in § 11-1528, judicial review in § 11-1529, the
Commission's rule-making power in § 11-1525(a), and the filing of financial statements by
judges in § 11-1530. 22 D.C. Reg. 2199, 2199-2200 (Nov. 4, 1975).
85. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 432(c)(1), 87 Stat. 774 (1973). "If the conviction is reversed or
the order of removal is set aside, the judge shall be reinstated and shall recover his salary
and all rights and privileges of his office." Id.
86. Id. § 432(c)(2). The judge will receive his retirement benefits during the suspen-
sion. "If the order of involuntary retirement is set aside, the judge shall be reinstated and
shall recover his judicial salary less any retirement salary received and shall be entitled to
all the rights and privileges of his office." Id.
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have the discretion to suspend a judge, with salary, once they have
prescribed a hearing for his retirement or removal.8 7
As previously indicated, most judicial indiscretions probably do not
warrant removal. Instead, a formal reprimand should suffice. 88 Although
the Home Rule Act mentions only removal and ancillary suspension as a
remedy for improper judicial conduct, the Commissioners contend they
have the implied authority to levy a reprimand in lieu of removal. This
interpretation is premised on the principle that the greater power encom-
passes the lesser. 89 The Commission's position was sustained by Judge
Thomsen in Halleck v. Berliner.'
There are certain procedures which the Commission must follow once
a complaint is filed. 9' Basically, the statute delineates the Commission's
responsibilities to the judge during the course of an investigation, hear-
ing, and adjudication. 92 This section also stipulates the treatment of
witnesses and evidence throughout the proceedings. 93 On November 4,
1975, the Commission promulgated a set of rules and regulations to
govern its disciplinary and involuntary retirement functions. 94 These
regulations operate to augment and clarify the procedures outlined in the
legislation.
The Commission is authorized to dismiss complaints and investigate
those allegations which appear to have some basis. The regulations
signify that the Commission may undertake an initial probe to ascertain
whether the complaint should be pursued and proceed with whatever
additional investigation is necessary. If the Commission determines that
a formal proceeding is justified, the judge will be notified. 95 The
Commission's Annual Report I describes a more elaborate and flexible
structure which includes communication with the judge before the
Notice of Formal Proceeding has been issued and opportunities for an
informal resolution of the case at any time. 96
87. Id. § 432(c)(3).
88. See notes 37-40 & accompanying text supra.
89. 22 D.C. Reg. 2199, 2201 (Nov. 4, 1975); ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 2.
Apparently the original Commission believed it had the same power under the Court
Reform Act. See In re Alexander, Formal Case No. 1-71 at 30-31 (Commission on Judicial
Disabilities & Tenure, Feb. 14, 1972).
90. 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1245-47 (D.D.C. 1977); see text accompanying notes 4 & 5
supra.
91. D.C. Code § 11-1527 (1973). See note 84 supra.
92. D.C. Code § Il-1527(a),(b) (1973).
93. Id. § 11-1527(c),(d),(e).
94. While characterized as amending the Commission's rules and regulations, these
provisions essentially supersede those published by the former Commission. Compare 22
D.C. Reg. 2199, 2199-218 (Nov. 4, 1975) with 17 D.C. Reg. 22,694, 22,711 (May 3, 1971).
95. 22 D.C. Reg. 2199, 2210-12 (Nov. 4, 1975).
96. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 3.
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Under section 111 of the Court Reform Act, the Commissioners
cannot order an involuntary retirement or removal without first conduct-
ing a hearing. 97 A reprimand, however, may be issued without this
requirement if the judge has relinquished his right to a hearing. 98 The
respondent judge must receive advance notice of the hearing and the
basis for the inquiry. Moreover, the judge is entitled to attend all hear-
ings relating to his conduct, engage counsel, submit evidence, and
confront adverse witnesses. 99 The Commission must maintain a record
of any hearing and furnish the respondent with a copy. 10 The members
are required to prepare their findings within ninety days of the hearing. If
the Commission decides to remove or retire the judge, an appropriate
order must be filed with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and
the Commission must contact the respondent, the chief judge of his
court, and the President. 10 The judge may appeal any order rendered by
the Commission to a federal three-judge panel selected by the Chief
Justice. 102
During investigations and hearings, the Commission may allow for
discovery and the attendance or deposition of witnesses. The Commis-
sion is also empowered to grant transactional immunity to witnesses who
invoke their right against self-incrimination and refuse to testify. 03 The
Commission may petition the district court for an order compelling both
discovery and the appearance of witnesses who will be compensated for
their time. 101
97. D.C. Code § 11-1527(a)(1) (1973).
98. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 2.
99. D.C. Code § 11-1527(a)(2) (1973).
100. Id. § 11-1527(b).
101. Id. § 11-1527(a)(3). Under this section, four members must agree to remove or
retire a judge. When the first Commission was created in 1970 there were only five
members on the board. Id. § 11-1522. The Home Rule Act, however, provides for seven
members. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 431(d)(1), 87 Stat. 774 (1973). There is little indication
whether Congress intended to reduce the consensus needed to remove or retire a judge or
whether the failure to change the ratio was merely inadvertent.The degree of concurrence required of the first Commission undoubtedly reflected an
attitude that removal and involuntary retirement are severe sanctions which should not be
invoked unless most of the Commissioners believed it was warranted. Therefore it seems
reasonable to assume that Congress simply neglected to make the necessary numerical
change. Many jurisdictions, however, require only a majority vote. Compare FLA.
CONST. art. 5, § 17(A)(2)(c) (two-thirds vote) and DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37 (two-thirds
vote) with ALAS. STAT. § 22.30.050 (1976) (majority vote); California Commission on
Judicial Performance, Rules for Censure, Removal, or Retirement of Judges, R. 917
(majority vote); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 25 (majority vote) and Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia, Judicial Disability & Retirement Board Rules of Procedure, R. 14 (majority vote).
102. D.C. Code § 11-1529 (1973); see note 84 & accompanying text supra.
103. D.C. Code § 11-1527(c)(2) (1973).
104. Id. § 11-1527(c). The Commission's regulations state the Commission may request
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As mentioned earlier, 0 the Home Rule Act devolved an additional
obligation upon the Commission: its members must appraise the per-
formance of any judge desiring reappointment. 106 In presenting the
conference substitute for S. 1435, Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D.
Mich.) explained that since the Tenure Commission was regularly in-
volved with accounts of judicial performance, responsibility for prepar-
ing the evaluation reports was delegated to its members. 107 Apparently
Congress hoped the new reappointment technique would attract many
candidates for judicial office by predicating continued tenure on merit
rather than arbitrary political or philosophical considerations.
Following this legislative policy, the Commission has correctly per-
ceived the limitations of its evaluative role:
The Commission's standards authorize no judgment on the
judge's philosophy. The Commission firmly adheres to the view
that it is immaterial to its evaluation whether the judge is "liber-
al" or "conservative," "lenient" or "severe," or whether
Commission members agree or disagree with the merits of his
decisions or the trend of his legal thinking.108
The procedure for this evaluation, which is directed by the statute and
regulations formulated by the Commission, is fairly simple but the
ramifications are significant. To inaugurate an evaluation, the judge
seeking review must remit a declaration of his candidacy to the Commis-
sion at least three months before his current term ends.l°9 Otherwise a
vacancy will occur and the selection of a new judge shifts to the Judicial
Nomination Commission. 110 Once this statement has been filed, the
Commissioners must draft an evaluation of the candidate's performance
during his present tenure and his eligibility for reappointment to an
additional term. This report must be submitted to the President at least
thirty days before the candidate's existing term expires."'
In the written evaluation prepared for the President, the Commission
must rate a candidate as exceptionally well qualified, well qualified,
an order from either the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or the United States
District Court for the district in which the person may be found. 22 D.C. Reg. 2199, 2204-
05 (Nov. 4, 1975).
105. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
106. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 433(c), 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
107. 119 CONG. REC. 42038 (1973).
108. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 5.
109. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 433(c), 87 Stat. 774 (1973). The regulations recommend that
a candidate announce his candidacy at least six months prior to the end of his term. 22
D.C. Reg. 6441, 6441 (May 19, 1976).
110. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 433(c), 87 Stat. 774 (1973); see note 74, supra.
S11. Pub. L. No. 93-198, § 433(c), 87 Stat. 774 (1973).
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qualified, or unqualified for appointment to another term. Once the
Commissioners decide a candidate is either exceptionally well qualified
or well qualified, the judge's tenure is automatically extended. If the
judge receives a rating of qualified, the President may nominate and
reappoint him, subject to Senate approval. If the President declines to
nominate the individual, a vacancy results and again the Judicial Nomi-
nation Commission will be responsible for choosing nominees. Lastly, if
the Commission deems a candidate unqualified, the President will not
consider him for reappointment ". . . and such judge shall not be
eligible for reappointment or appointment as a judge of a District of
Columbia Court.""1
2
The Commission did not promulgate any standards for these classifica-
tions until May 19, 1976, when it added another part to its published rules
and regulations, 13 establishing the following criteria:
A. Exceptionally Well Qualified-The judge's work product,
legal scholarship, dedication, efficiency and demeanor are
preeminent.
B. Well Qualified-The judge performs the judicial function
with distinction and in a manner which consistently reflects
credit on the judicial system.
C. Qualified-The judge satisfactorily performs the judicial
function or is one whose strong positive attributes are materially
offset, but not overborne, by negative traits.
D. Unqualified-The judge is unfit for further judicial ser-
vice."14
These standards correspond to the language used in the Commission's
earlier evaluation of Judge Halleck.
15
The Commissioners invite the judge to forward a statement regarding
his candidacy. Apparently the Commissioners depend quite heavily on
interviews with people who are familiar with the candidate's judicial
performance for material regarding the judge's fitness. Specifically,
court personnel and attorneys who have appeared before the judge are
questioned. The Commission also makes a general solicitation to the
public for information and requests certain agencies which have continu-
al contact with the court system to provide relevant information."16 The
112. Id.
113. 22 D.C. Reg. 6441, 6441-46 (May 19, 1976).
114. Id. at 6442.
115. See Report to the President of the United States on the Fitness for Reappointment
of Judge Charles W. Halleck from the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial
Disabilities & Tenure (Sept. 19, 1975), partially reprinted in 103 DAILY WASH. L. REP.
1652 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report on Judge Halleck].
116. 22 D.C. Reg. 6441, 6443 (May 19, 1976).
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Commissioners justify this reliance by citing the inherent difficulty of
reviewing an individual's performance over a long period of time, the
minimal staff and time allotted to the Commission, and the model pre-
sented by the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary."17
The regulations present a method of securing information concerning a
candidate from interested and knowledgable persons. Judge Halleck
raised certain objections to this practice, claiming the Commission had
been unduly influenced by material from the office of the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia. Judge Thomsen dismissed this
argument and approved the Commission's policy. 1 8 He asserted the
Commission had an obligation to collect and weigh information from
people in the community, especially those who had appeared before the
candidate, despite the possibility of bias. 119 The Commission itself has
recognized that a potential for partiality exists, but insists it "is quite
capable of discounting for any bias."' ' 20
The regulations also prescribe the nature and timing of the Commis-
sion's contacts with the judge. The candidate may be requested to
undergo a medical examination at the Commission's expense and the
judge is required to execute any necessary waivers and releases to enable
the Commission to obtain relevant medical and tax information. '21 Either
the candidate or the Commission may request a private conference
which counsel for both parties may attend. 122
117. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 5. The following notice is an example of the
press releases issued by the Commission to the local media and national wire services:
NOTICE OF CANDIDATE FOR JUDICIAL REAPPOINTMENT
This is to notify members of the bar and the general public that Judge Charles
W. Halleck, Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, is a
candidate for reappointment to the Superior Court upon the expiration of his term
on October 20, 1975 ....
[The notice recites the pertinent statutory provision and continues:] Written or
oral communications should be mailed or delivered by August 22, 1975 to mem-
bers of the Commission at its offices at 717 Madison Place, N.W., Room 212,
Washington, D.C. 20005, (telephone 628-1255) or to the attention of Ms. Cathaee
Hudgins, Administrative Assistant to the Commission.
Commission on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure, Notice of Candidate for Judicial Reap-
pointment, 103 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1325, 1325 (Aug. 4, 1975).
118. 427 F. Supp. at 1234-35.
119. Id.
120. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 6.
121. 22 D.C. Reg. 6441, 6443-44 (May 19, 1976). Each sitting judge is required to file an
annual financial statement with the Commission which includes a report on income,
liabilities, and interests in property. The Commission, however, relies solely on the judge
to furnish this statement. Failure to submit a report "or filing of a fraudulent report, shall
constitute willful misconduct in office and shall be grounds for removal from office under
section 11-1526(a)(2)." D.C. Code § 11-1530(b)(3) (1973).
122. 22 D.C. Reg. 6441, 6444-45 (May 19, 1976).
[Vol. 27:543
Judicial Tenure
If the judge's automatic reappointment is in jeopardy, the Commis-
sioners will divulge the basis for their concern and permit the candidate
to respond to the questions raised. However, an adversary hearing is not
required.' 23 Lastly, the statute does not denote any opportunity to appeal
the Commission's determination.
Because the Commissioners intend to print an annual report disclosing
their current activities, it should be fairly easy to monitor the Commis-
sion's effectiveness. On December 31, 1976, the Commission published
its first annual report, covering the period from April, 1975, to Septem-
ber, 1976.124
The profile of disciplinary matters shows that the full Commission
considered fifty-eight incidents involving judges of the superior court.
Most of the complaints were registered by individual litigants. Thirty-
eight charges were dropped almost immediately. Although the announce-
ment did not indicate why these cases were eliminated, it is probable that
many of the cases reported were outside the Commission's juris-
diction. 125 Following a preliminary examination, sixteen others were
123. Id. at 6445. The Commission's evaluation of Judge Halleck, which occurred in
late summer of 1975, was completed without the benefit of published guidelines. Judge
Halleck attacked this modus operandi; he alleged that in the absence of express proce-
dures and standards, the Commission's actions were arbitrary and violated due process.
Judge Thomsen did not view the Commission's failure to establish procedures constitu-
tionally infirm. Judge Thomsen remarked that the statute did not require the Commission
to afford the judge a formal hearing. He noted the substantial similarity between the
procedures which were eventually promulgated and those followed by the Commission in
1975. Judge Thomsen continued: "So long as the Commission affords a judge seeking
reappointment that process which is due, as the court concludes plaintiff was afforded,
the procedures need not be published in advance." 427 F. Supp. at 1237 n.15. Judge
Thomsen also rejected Halleck's allegation that the lack of established standards in-
validated the "qualified" rating Judge Halleck received from the Commission. Id. at 1238.
Judge Thomsen's analysis is appealing. A retrospective determination that the proce-
dures used were valid, however, does not entirely eliminate the disadvantages which
Judge Halleck incurred. He could not know which aspects of his tenure the Commission
might emphasize and tailor his presentation accordingly. Nor could Judge Halleck antici-
pate how the Commission would organize its evaluation or make timely and appropriate
objections to the Commission's procedures. Although the absence of procedures and
standards probably did not significantly prejudice Judge Halleck's evaluation, published
guidelines are infinitely superior to informal ones. Apparently the Commissioners agree as
they subsequently promulgated procedures and standards. See text accompanying notes
113-15 supra.
124. ANNUAL REPORT 1, supra note 17. Although the D.C. Home Rule Charter was
approved in a referendum held on May 7, 1974, and the Act became effective on February
1, 1975, appointments to the Commission were delayed and the Commission did not begin
operating until April of 1975. Id. at 1.
125. Id. at 1-2. Ms. Hudgins remarked that most of the allegations received by the
Commission are from litigants or their relatives who do not truly understand the Commis-
sion's authority or purpose. They object to individual verdicts or sentences which are
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abandoned. 12 6 The four remaining cases necessitated some official re-
sponse. Two inquests were concluded with private, informal letters to
the judges involved, while a Notice of Formal Proceeding was issued to
each of the other judges.' 27 In fiscal year 1977, thirty-two complaints
were lodged with the Commission. Three disciplinary investigations
were still pending on September 30, 1977. During this period the
Commission also conducted its first health inquiry. 128
The disciplinary review of Judge Halleck's behavior was completed
during this period. Prior to the formal hearing conducted by the Commis-
sion, Judge Thomsen determined that ordinarily the Commission has the
discretion to apprise the public of its determination not to remove a judge
even though sufficient grounds exist. 129 Nevertheless, Judge Thomsen
ruled:
[B]ecause of the publicity already given to both the instant case
and the Commission's proceedings in regard to plaintiff, the
beyond the Commission's prerogative. Interview with Cathaee Hudgins in Washington,
D.C. (Aug. 26, 1977).
In a similar vein the Commission itself has commented:
In carrying out its disciplinary role, the Commission seeks carefully to distinguish
between a judge's conduct that might warrant its scrutiny and judicial action
which, if questionable at all, is merely erroneous and should be subject only to
appellate review. The Commission has observed that disappointed litigants some-
times communicate complaints to the Commission that do not reflect an under-
standing of this important distinction. The distinction, on occasion, is difficult to
draw, and there are circumstances wherein the distinction is only one of degree.
For example, unwarranted exercise of the contempt power is correctable on
appeal, but a point can be reached where its persistent exercise or threat could
amount to conduct meriting the Commission's attention.
ANNUAL REPORT 1, supra note 17, at 2.
126. ANNUAL REPORT 1, supra note 17, at 2.
127. Id. On May 17, 1976, the Commission directed a reprimand to Associate Judge
Edward A. Beard of the Superior Court, now retired, criticizing his participation in the
release of a defendant who was the subject of a civil ne exeat proceeding. The Commis-
sion denounced the course followed to perfect the release and admonished Judge Beard
for failing to refer the case to a designated emergency judge..
However, the Commission also acknowledged that Judge Beard did not benefit from the
transaction and did not question his personal integrity. The Commissioners balanced these
findings and concluded: "[T]he Commission believes that your conduct was ill-advised
and that its irregularities could have given rise to the appearance of impropriety; it is
therefore disapproved." Letter from Commission on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure to
Judge Edward A. Beard at 3 (May 17, 1976). The reprimand was made public and excerpts
appeared in a local newspaper. Wash. Post, May 21, 1976 § C, at 1, col. 5.
The second formal proceeding, which involved Judge Halleck, was still pending when
the first annual report was prepared. ANNUAL REPORT 1, supra note 17, at 2. Judge
Halleck's case is discussed at text accompanying notes 129-32 & 173-89 infra.
128. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DIS-
ABILITIES AND TENURE (October 1976-September 1977), at I (hereinafter cited as ANNUAL
REPORT 11).
129. 427 F. Supp. at 1247.
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wisest course is to require that if the Commission should deter-
mine that grounds for removal of plaintiff exist, but that under
all the circumstances plaintiff should not be removed from
office, no public statement to that effect shall be made (regard-
less of whether the Commission also concludes that its decision
and the reasons therefor should be made public), unless (a)
plaintiff authorizes that a public statement be made, or (b) the
judgment which will be entered in this case is affirmed on
appeal, or (c) the time for taking such an appeal has elapsed. 30
Judge Halleck has not consented to a release of his records. He did,
however, file two appeals which were subsequently dismissed: one by
the court as moot and the other at Judge Halleck's request.
Despite these events, the Commission recently refused to disclose the
results of its disciplinary proceeding against Halleck.131 Perhaps the
Commissioners believe none of the conditions precedent to releasing this
information have been met. More likely, however, the Commissioners
are being extremely circumspect and have decided not to produce their
evaluation due to the special circumstances described by Judge Thom-
sen. Alternatively, one might assume either that Judge Halleck was
exonerated of any impropriety or that his misconduct warranted only a
private reprimand. A newspaper article, however, suggested that Hal-
leck was rebuked by the Commission. 32
The Commission has also had several opportunities to exercise its
reappointment powers. Between April, 1975, and September, 1976, four
judges whose original terms were scheduled to end announced their
candidacy for reappointment. Since one applicant later withdrew his
candidacy, 3 3 the Commission actually finished only three evaluations
during this period. The Commission determined that two of the judges
were exceptionally well qualified 34 and one was qualified. 35
130. Id.
131. Telephone conversation with Cathaee Hudgins (Sept. 15, 1977).
132. See note 185 infra.
133. Judge Alexander announced his retirement on September 10, 1976, effective
November 8, 1976. 104 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1925 (1976); see note I supra.
134. See, Report to the President of the United States on the Fitness for Reappoint-
ment of Chief Judge Harold Greene from the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial
Disabilities & Tenure (Oct. I, 1976); Report to the President of the United States on the
Fitness for Reappointment of Judge Tim Murphy from the District of Columbia Commis-
sion on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure (Oct. 1, 1976), reprinted in 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep.
1753, 1756 (1976).
Under the statute, this rating guarantees automatic reappointment. See text accompany-
ing note 112 supra.
135. The report on Judge Halleck was forwarded to the President on September 19,
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From October 1, 1976, through September 30, 1977, the Commission-
ers considered an additional four reappointments. All three superior
court candidates were deemed well qualified, 136 while the court of ap-
peals candidate was classified exceptionally well qualified. 137 More re-
cently, the Commission evaluated the performance of three other
superior court judges. All of these candidates will be automatically
reappointed. 38
IV. THE COMMISSION'S PROSPECTS
It would be premature to judge the Commission's impact on the basis
of available data. Assessed in the abstract, the D.C. Commission
compares favorably to other tenure systems as it possesses many qual-
ities which promote independent and effective boards: 139 the Commis-
sion is an independent agency with a diverse membership of lawyers,
laypersons, and a federal district court judge which should shield tenure
decisions from extraneous influences.
1975. See note 115 supra. This rating shifts the responsibility for reappointment to the
President and the Senate. See text accompanying note 112 supra. The circumstances
surrounding Judge Halleck's prolonged candidacy are set forth at text accompanying
notes 167-89 infra.
136. See Report to the President of the United States on the Fitness for Reappointment
of Judge Fred L. McIntyre from the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Dis-
abilities & Tenure (Feb. 18, 1977), reprinted in 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 353 (1977);
Report to the President of the United States on the Fitness for Reappointment of Judge
Alfred Burka from the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure
(May 27, 1977) reprinted in 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 977 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Report on Judge Burka]; Report to the President of the United States on the Fitness for
Reappointment of Judge John D. Fauntleroy from the District of Columbia Commission
on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure (May 27, 1977), reprinted in 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP.
985 (1977). This classification assures reappointment. See text accompanying note 112
supra.
137. See Report to the President of the United States on the Fitness for Reappointment
of Judge Catherine G. Kelly from the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial
Disabilities & Tenure (May 27, 1977), reprinted in 105 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 965 (1977).
138. Judge Belson received a unanimous exceptionally well qualified rating. Report to
the President of the United States on the Fitness for Reappointment of Judge James A.
Belson from the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure (Jan.
27, 1978) reprinted in 106 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 205 (1978). The votes for Judge Pryor and
Judge Green, however, were split. Two Commissioners graded Judge Pryor as exception-
ally well qualified while four regarded him well qualified. Report to the President of the
United States on the Fitness for Reappointment of Judge William C. Pryor from the
District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure (Jan. 27, 1978) re-
printed in 106 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 213 (1978). Judge Green received three well qualified
and three exceptionally well qualified votes. Report to the President of the United States
on the Fitness for Reappointment of Judge Joyce Hens Green from the District of
Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities & Tenure (Jan. 27, 1978), reprinted in 106
DAILY WASH. L. REP. 197 (1978).
139. See text accompanying notes 20-48 supra.
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The District's Commission does have a small staff: one executive
assistant to handle daily operations, a Special Counsel retained on a
continuous basis to represent the Commission,' 40 and an investigator
employed on an ad hoc basis.' 4' Although more administrative support is
probably needed, the executive assistant's presence facilitates the re-
ceipt and distribution of complaints and information, an extremely im-
portant function. In the future, the projected annual report should fur-
nish sufficient data to measure the Commission's performance.
The Commission's structure and the regulations formulated by its
members should promote a prompt and thorough review of both discipli-
nary matters and reappointments while affording judges many procedur-
al protections. To date, the Commission seems to have provided a more
efficient and effective disciplinary device than the mere threat of im-
peachment. 142 Not only has it condemned the behavior of several judges
since 1971, but its reappointment provisions preclude prolonged vacan-
cies, since the evaluations must be completed thirty days before a candi-
date's term expires. In addition to its broad disciplinary and retirement
powers, the District of Columbia Tenure Commission has the unique
authority of reappointment.
These features will enable the Commission to select sanctions appro-
priate to individual circumstances and condition judicial tenure on merit
rather than political or ideological predilections. Moreover, the composi-
tion of the Commission and its extensive authority comport with the
spirit of home rule.
Notwithstanding these positive attributes, there are deficiencies which
might eventually affect the Commission's credibility as well as its ability
to function competently. 143 First, the Commission needs to become more
140. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 7.
141. ANNUAL REPORT II, supra note 128, at 9.
142. See notes 56-61 & accompanying text supra. Available records indicate that no
member of the local court system was ever impeached.
143. One criticism which is tangential to the Commission's operation and authority
concerns the roles performed by the President and Senate in reappointment proceedings.
Although the Presidential and Senate participation is extremely limited, it seems absurd to
continue even this degree of federal supervision over a local judiciary. Instead, this
responsibility (along with initial appointments, see note 74 supra) should be vested in the
mayor and City Council who are probably more familiar with an individual's judicial
performance and have an immediate interest in preserving the integrity of the court
system.
While the United States Government has a special interest in protecting the status of the
Federal City, the alarm expressed during Congressional debate over which executive and
which legislature should have the final appointment power was exaggerated. See generally
119 CONG. REC. 33365-68, 42041-42 (1973) (remarks of Congressmen Nelson and Broyhill).
Congressional concern was excessive, given the many other safeguards included in the
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widely known. Since the Commission depends on information from
individuals and organizations in the community, people must be aware of
the Commission's existence and responsibilities.
The Commissioners realize they cannot operate properly without input
from attorneys and others:
[U]nless the community, and especially lawyers having regular
contact with the courts, take initiative in bringing to the
Commission's attention information pertaining both to its disci-
plinary and to its evaluation functions, it will be difficult if not
impossible fully to accomplish the objectives of Congress in
creating an important instrument of home rule. 144
Yet the Commission's efforts to stimulate interest have apparently been
misguided as the response from all sectors, especially from the general
public, has been limited and disappointing. 145
Of course, it is often difficult to prompt public participation. Nonethe-
less, the Commission must encourage and obtain actionable complaints
and pertinent evaluative information from a variety of sources. Other-
wise, the Commission might receive a less than accurate image of the
judge or remain unaware of objectionable conduct. In this respect, the
Commission should study the possibility of making public service an-
nouncements on television and radio and generally expanding media
coverage of its activities.
Another problem concerns the exact scope of the Commission's au-
thority. The Commissioners claim, and Judge Thomsen agreed, that the
statutory power to remove incorporates the capacity to reprimand. 146 Yet
the issue remains, under what conditions may the Commission levy a
penalty short of removal?
In addressing the question, Judge Thomsen first concluded that the
Commission is limited to reviewing conduct which is proscribed by the
statute.147 But the judge also assumed that the Commission must deter-
mine that a prima facie case for removal exists before instituting any
action: "[T]he Commission should not institute any disciplinary investi-
gation or proceeding unless the Commission believes that the alleged
conduct, if proved, may warrant removal from office on the grounds set
out in the statute.' ' 4
8
Home Rule Act, see note 75 supra, and the ultimate authority over the District which
Congress possesses.
144. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 7.
145. Id. at 5-7.
146. See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
147. 427 F. Supp. at 1245.
148. Id. at 1245 n.38 (emphasis added).
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Essentially, Judge Thomsen believes the Commissioners may impose a
reprimand only after they have decided that although grounds for remov-
al exist, mitigating circumstances justify a lesser sanction. Although one
might properly infer that the Commission has the lesser power to cen-
sure, it does not inevitably follow, as Judge Thomsen insists, that the
alleged misbehavior must meet a removal threshold before the Commis-
sion may act. Neither the statutory language, nor the Commission's
regulations compel this result.
49
The Act simply authorizes the Commission to remove, retire, or sus-
pend a judge for a variety of reasons. 50 The statutory procedures for
investigating judicial behavior do not require that an initial threshold be
met. '' Furthermore, the regulations governing Commission disciplinary
proceedings allow a preliminary investigation to determine whether for-
mal action should be pursued.'
149. Judge Thomsen attempted to distinguish two state supreme court cases, In re
Dupont, 322 So. 2d 180 (La. 1975) and In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974), because the applicable provisions were different from the
D.C. Act. Id. at 1246 n.39.
In Dupont, the Louisiana Supreme Court was applying a state constitutional provision
which specifically granted the tenure commission power over removal and involuntary
retirement. The court determined: "[ I n our view, the Judiciary Commission's right under
the 1921 La. Const. (Art. IX, Sec. 4 subd. D) to recommend 'the removal or involuntary
retirement of a justice or judge' includes the lesser power to recommend censure." 322
So. 2d at 183.
Under Maryland's Constitution, the court of appeals may remove, retire, or censure a
judge while the Commission on Judicial Disabilities is empowered to submit recommenda-
tions for removal and disability retirement only to the court of appeals. MD. CONST. art.
IV, § 4B. Pursuant to its authority to promulgate procedures for the Commission, the
court of appeals adopted a rule which included the authority to recommend censure in
addition to removal and retirement. MD. R. 1227 n.
In upholding the constitutionality of the rule the Maryland Supreme Court explained:
[W]e cannot escape concluding that the grant of the greater power impliedly
includes the lesser. If we have the power to retire, remove or censure, certainly
the Commission can recommend identical sanctions. To hold otherwise would
mean that so limiting the Commission's authority to a recommendation of retire-
ment or removal only would create a void into which minor infractions would fall,
unnoticed and uncorrected.
268 Md. at 683, 304 A.2d at 600.
150. D.C. Code § 11-1521 (1973).
151. Id. at § 11-1527.
152. 22 D.C. Reg. 2199, 2210-12 (Nov. 4, 1975). The portion of the regulations entitled
"Procedures for Investigations and Formal Proceedings" states:
Preliminary Investigation
(a) The Commission, upon receiving information by way of formal or informal
complaint or report or otherwise (that a judge has engaged in questionable
conduct) . ..may make a preliminary investigation to determine whether a
formal proceeding should be instituted.
(b) If the Commission concludes that the information, complaint, or report is
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Judge Thomsen's approach is overly restrictive and would preclude
the Commission from attacking injudicious conduct which does not, on
its face, warrant removal. If his analysis is correct, Congress may wish
to reconsider the problem. Surely the Commission should be empowered
to regulate all degrees of misbehavior. 153 Otherwise, the Commission will
be unable to check behavior which, though insufficient for removal, still
reflects badly on the judiciary. In addition, the Commission's ability to
pursue an informal resolution might be hampered if the judge believes his
actions do not fall within the Commission's jurisdiction.
Another potential source of continued controversy involves the stan-
dards for reviewing a judge's conduct. In his action against the Commis-
sion, Judge Halleck argued that the criteria for examining a judge's
behavior are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.154 Judge Thomsen,
however, rejected this objection.'5 He noted that challenges to the
constitutionality of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct have not succeeded because "the Code . . .furnished suffi-
cient specification of the judicial conduct which warrants disciplinary
action."' 56 Judge Thomsen pointed out that the Commission's Notice of
Formal Proceeding specifically referred to those portions of the Code
which Judge Halleck might have violated. Judge Thomsen concluded
that since the Code provisions supplement the standards listed in the
Act, the statutory standards do not violate the due process clause.' 
57
In spite of Judge Thomsen's opinion, these guidelines are quite subjec-
tive and open to abuse, especially when coupled with the Commission's
policy of considering mitigating factors. To appreciate this problem, one
unfounded, frivolous, without sufficient merit for further consideration, or is
beyond its jurisdiction, it may close the matter without further action and may
notify the complainant, if there be one, and the judge, of such conclusion. If on
the other hand it appears to have substance and falls within the Commission's
jurisdiction the Commission's investigation will go forward to determine whether
a formal proceeding should be instituted ...
153. Id. See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
154. 427 F. Supp. at 1239.
155. Id. at 1240.
156. Id.
157. Id. Judge Halleck also complained that the combination of investigative, prosecu-
torial, and adjudicative functions into one agency violated due process guarantees. In
rejecting this claim, Judge Thomsen relied on Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), as
well as a number of lower court decisions. Id. at 1243-44.
Commentators, however, criticize the consolidation of all these duties in one adminis-
trative agency. Cf. B. SHIMBERG, B. ESSER, & D. KRUGER, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING:
PRACTICES AND POLICIES 11-15, 216, 227-28 (1973) (discussing the delegation of investiga-
tive, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions to one licensing agency). To avoid future
challenges it will be necessary to separate completely the investigative and prosecutorial
responsiblities from the adjudicative ones.
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might compare Judge Halleck's candidacy for reappointment with that of
another superior court judge. While Judge Halleck received only a
qualified rating, primarily on account of his courtroom misdemeanor, 158
a subsequent candidate was rated well qualified even though the
Commissioners admitted he frequently displayed judicial intemper-
ance. 1 59 Apparently the second judge's dedication and personal problems
sufficiently outweighed his injudicious behavior.160 Yet Judge Halleck's
"strong positive attributes" could only prevent an unqualified rating.' 61
Doubtless, all the facts of these two cases are not available and
perhaps the Commission's determinations were fair. Nevertheless, this
comparison suggests the degree to which subjective elements might enter
the Commission's decision. It is improbable that this uncertainty can be
eliminated.
The Commission could probably develop more definite and objective
criteria. The simplest solution would be to articulate what behavior is
forbidden. This practice, however, could not exhaust all possible in-
stances of unacceptable conduct. Furthermore, if the Commission is
restricted, the flexibility of the current system will be sacrificed. Accord-
ingly, the candidates and the public should accept the authority vested in
the Commission and trust that the members will exercise their discretion
wisely.
Another obstacle to the Commission's success relates to the Commis-
sion's efforts to preserve the confidentiality of its disciplinary proceed-
ings. Both the Court Reform Act and the Commission's regulations refer
to confidentiality. 62 The Commission avers it is only obligated to ensure
158. Report on Judge Halleck, supra note 115, at 4-5.
159. Report on Judge Burka, supra note 136, at 7-8.
160. Id. at 9-10.
161. Report on Judge Halleck, supra note 115, at 6. Compare Report on Judge Burka,
supra note 136, with Report on Judge Halleck, supra note 115.
162. The section in the Court Reform Act respecting privilege and confidentiality
reads:
The filing of papers with and the giving of testimony before the Commission shall
be privileged. Unless otherwise authorized by the judge whose conduct or health
is the subject of the proceedings under this subchapter, the hearings before the
Commission, the record thereof, and all papers filed in connection with such
hearings shall be confidential. But on prosecution of a witness for perjury or on
review of a decision of the Commission, the record of hearings before the
Commission and all papers filed in connection therewith shall be disclosed to the
extent required for the prosecution or review.
D.C. Code § 11-1528(a) (1973). The Commission's disciplinary and retirement regulations
basically iterate this statutory language, 22 D.C. Reg. 2199, 2209-10 (Nov. 4, 1975), but
another section of the regulations stipulates: "Every witness in every investigation or
other proceeding under these rules shall swear or affirm to tell the truth and not to disclose
the existence of the proceeding or the identity of the judge involved unless or until the
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the secrecy of the hearing process; nevertheless, it "makes every rea-
sonable effort to maintain confidentiality throughout all the preliminary
steps. "163
Judge Thomsen concurred in the Commission's view. He argued that
the Commission's regulations advert to witnesses only. Judge Thomsen
also stated it would not be feasible to pledge every participant to secrecy:
[The] language [of the rule] does not expressly require that each
person to whom the special counsel speaks while looking into a
complaint about a judge received by the Commission must be
formally sworn to confidentiality; the rule is framed in terms of
"witnesses". It would not be practicable for the special counsel
to require everyone with whom he has contact to make a formal
oath or affirmation.]64
Yet Judge Thomsen's reading of the rule might be too literal, for the
regulations also refer to "every investigation or other proceeding.' 1 65
Moreover, a limited rule of confidentiality is clearly inadequate. If priva-
cy cannot be sustained, the Commission might unwittingly subject the
judge to unjustified embarrassment, sacrifice the judge's cooperation,
and cripple its own capacity to mediate informal settlements.'6 The
infirmities inherent in the Commission's position were particularly
conspicuous during its investigation of Judge Halleck in 1976.
V. JUDGE HALLECK'S REAPPOINTMENT CANDIDACY
The leaks to the media which occurred throughout the Halleck investi-
gation adversely affected the judge's nomination for reappointment. One
might even conclude that the separate responsibilities of the legislature
and the Commission were ignored and the Senate, in effect, abrogated
the Commission's disciplinary role. Before examining this anomaly, a
brief history of Judge Halleck's candidacy is necessary.
Judge Halleck announced his candidacy more than three months be-
fore his first term was due to expire. 167 After an intensive and controver-
sial inquiry,16 the Commission conferred a rating of qualified and for-
proceeding is no longer confidential under these rules." Id. at 2204. The Commission's
regulations governing its reappointment duties also contain a provision for privilege and
confidentiality which protects both the judge and individuals who supply information to
the Commission. 22 D.C. Reg. 6441, 6445-46 (May 19, 1976).
163. ANNUAL REPORT I, supra note 17, at 3.
164. 427 F. Supp. at 1243.
165. 22 D.C. Reg. 2199, 2204 (Nov. 4, 1976); see note 162 supra.
166. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
167. Judge Halleck was originally appointed on October 20, 1965, for a 10 year term.
He declared his candidacy for a second term on July 10, 1975, 3 months and 10 days prior
to the end of his tenure.
168. Apparently the Commission received a large volume of disparaging commentary
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warded the evaluation to President Ford on September 19, 1975.169 The
President submitted Halleck's name to the Senate on October 20, 1975.170
Following a hearing and extended deliberation, the Senate Committee on
the District of Columbia voted unanimously for Halleck's renomination
on August 10, 1976, and finally reported to the full Senate seventeen
days later. 17 1
In explaining the long delay over Judge Halleck's nomination, Senator
Thomas Eagleton, the committee chairman who had supported Halleck's
candidacy, commented: "I wanted to determine over a period of time
what Halleck's future might be. I wanted to stand back and take a
from the United States Attorney's office and reviewed approximately 42 cases decided by
Judge Halleck. Additionally, there was considerable criticism over the lack of procedures,
and concomitant fears that Judge Halleck was not receiving a fair review of his qualifica-
tions. See Wash. Post, Sept. 12, 1975, § A, at i, col. 6; Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1975, § A, at
1, col. 4; Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1975, § C, at 1, col. 5; Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1975, § C, at 1,
col. 5; Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1975, § A, at I col. 5.
169. Report on Judge Halleck, supra note 115. The report summarized Judge Halleck's
affirmative and negative qualities and continued:
In considering the qualifications and fitness of a sitting judge special attention
must be paid to the manner in which the judge conducts his day to day business in
court. In large metropolitan courts such as the Superior Court, judges confront
overloaded dockets, inadequate facilities, insufficient supporting help and must
frequently deal with inexperienced or ill-prepared lawyers and other frustrating
conditions. If a judge permits these conditions to undermine his necessary re-
straint and immateriality, he serves the administration of justice badly and if he
cannot place his exasperations under control he should not remain in office.
Litigants, witnesses, lawyers, court personnel and others present in court soon
lose respect for justice when a judge interjects his personal views unduly into
litigation or resorts to sarcasm, banter, rudeness and other unjudicial conduct. An
atmosphere of prejudice and favoritism is created which undermines the integrity
of the system.
In spite of the substantial negative aspects of Judge Halleck's judicial perform-
ance, his strong positive attributes lead us to determine that he is qualified for
reappointment.
Id. at 5-6.
170. Wash. Post, Oct. 21, 1975, § A, at 1, col. I
171. EXEC. RPr. No. 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Notwithstanding the unanimous
vote, three committee members reserved the right to address the Senate during debate and
to oppose the appointment. The Committee's evaluation read in part:
Faced with [a] . . .widely differing assessment by members of the public and the
bar, the Committee gave great weight in arriving at its decision on this nomination
to the conclusion reached by the Tenure Commission for two reasons.
First, from a legal and institutional standpoint, the Tenure Commission is the
agency of the District of Columbia with primary responsiblity for evaluating
judicial performance. This committee's commitment to the principle of home
rule for the District of Columbia. requires that whenever possible deference be
given to local governmental decisions on local matters. In this connection, it
should be emphasized that decisions respecting the State courts are, generally
speaking, local ones, for the Superior Court is the 'state' court for the District of
Columbia . . ..
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dispassionate look. In the intervening months. . . Halleck wasn't totally
immaculate, but I'm convinced Judge Halleck knows it was a close call
and that's going to benefit him.' ' 72
Meanwhile, since March, 1976, the Commission had been studying
several incidents involving Judge Halleck and on June 14, 1976, the
Commission issued a Notice of Formal Proceeding.173 The notice indi-
cated that if the information received by the Commission were sustained,
Judge Halleck would have violated Canons 2A174 and 3A(3) 7 5 of the
Judicial Code of Conduct, which would warrant further Commission
action. Reporters for the Washington Post were apprised of the Commis-
sion's activities and the newspaper began publishing detailed accounts of
these events. 176
Subsequently, Senator McClellan, a member of the Senate Committee
on the District of Columbia which had initially reviewed Halleck's nomi-
nation, contacted the Commission to inquire whether the Commission
was prosecuting Halleck and when the disciplinary proceeding would be
finished. 177 Citing the confidentiality restrictions, the Commission's
The second reason for relying heavily on the conclusion of the Tenure Commis-
sion in this instance is more pragmatic. The Tenure Commission is representative
of the community and is in a better position to determine community needs and to
assess the ability of judicial candidates to meet those needs than is the Senate.
Moreover, several members of the Tenure Commission, by virtue of their exten-
sive experience as judges and attorneys in the District of Columbia, are particu-
larly well suited to balance the positive and negative qualities of Judge Halleck
and arrive at a sound decision ....
Finally, in reaching its decision on this nomination, the Committee is mindful
that the Tenure Commission's disciplinary powers under § 432 of the Act can-
and should-be brought to bear if Judge Halleck's future conduct should prompt
an adverse finding as to his qualifications at any time during his term of office.
Id. at 5-6.
172. Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1976, § A, at 6, col. 1.
173. Inquiry concerning a Judge, No. 2-76 (Commission on Judicial Disabilities &
Tenure, June 14, 1976) (attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit B in Halleck v.
Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1977)).
174. "A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary." ABA JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT, Canon 2A.
175. "A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, wit-
nesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require
similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his
direction and control." Id. at Canon 3A(3).
176. As early as May, over a month before the Notice of Formal Proceeding was
mailed, the Washington Post reported that Halleck was under investigation by the
Commission. Wash. Post, May 7, 1976, § A, at 1, col. 3.
177. Letter from Senator John McClellan to Chairman Henry A. Berliner (Aug. 27,
1976) (attached to Defendant's Answer as Exhibit 3 in Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp.
1245 (D.D.C. 1977)).
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chairman declined to confirm the existence of any pending action against
Judge Halleck.178 Chairman Berliner explained to Senator McClellan that
confidentiality was designed to protect a judge from unproven allega-
tions.
Senator McClellan next asked Judge Halleck to relinquish his confi-
dentiality privilege so the Senate could examine the rumored Commis-
sion charges before voting on his nomination. 179 Senator McClellan re-
portedly secured promises from the other Committee members not to
bring Halleck's nomination up for discussion before the Senate unless
the judge consented to a release of the Commission records.1 80
The confrontation with Senator McClellan placed Judge Halleck in an
untenable position. He could either accede to the Senator's request and
risk having the Senate consider charges which the Commission had not
yet fully explored or refuse to waive his privilege and forfeit the nomina-
tion. "81
Judge Halleck refused. He claimed he could not legally waive his right
to confidentiality and argued if he yielded, the value of the privilege for
other judges would be diminished. 182 His nomination was never reviewed
by the full Senate before the body adjourned from October 2, 1976, until
January 1977., Under the Senate's Standing Rules, Halleck's nomination
had to be returned to the President and resubmitted before the Senate
could consider it. 183 President Ford did not resubmit Halleck's nomina-
178. Letter from Chairman Henry A. Berliner to Senator John McClellan (Aug. 31,
1976) (attached to Defendant's Answer as Exhibit 4 in Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp.
1245 (D.D.C. 1977)).
179. Letter from Senator John McClellan to Judge Halleck (Sept. 10, 1976) (existence
of the letter reported in Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1976, § D, at 2, col. 5, and in Plaintiff's
Complaint in Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1977)).
180. Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1976, § D, at 2, col. 5.
181. Judge Halleck made this same argument to Judge Thomsen, but he contended that
the Commission itself had disclosed the existence of the formal proceeding, thereby
influencing his candidacy. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law at 47-49, Halleck v. Berliner
427 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1977). Judge Thomsen ruled that no Commission members or
employees had disclosed the existence of the secret proceedings. 427 F. Supp. at 1243.
182. Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1976, § D, at 2, col. 5.
183. Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they
are made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again
made to the Senate by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a
recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally acted
upon at the time of taking such adjournment or recess ahll be returned by the
Secretary to the President, and shall not again be considered unless they shall
again be made to the Senate by the President.
Senate Committee on Rules & Administration, Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate &
Provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946 & 1970 relating to Operation of
the Senate (Mar. 7, 1975).
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tion before leaving office on January 21, 1977.184 Four months later,
President Carter announced he would not tender Halleck's name to the
Senate. 185 Therefore, when Halleck rejected McClellan's ultimatum, the
Senator was able to block the judge's reappointment.186
The deliberate obstruction of Judge Halleck's nomination on the basis
of a pending disciplinary action, which is within the purview of the
Commission, not the Senate, is highly objectionable. In originally ap-
proving Judge Halleck's nomination, the Senate Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia acknowledged the distinct functions exercised by the
Commission and the Senate. The Committee noted that the judge had
engaged in questionable practices. But, rather than reject Halleck's
nomination, the Committee members deferred to the Commission's
evaluation and simply urged that he be disciplined if his misconduct
continued. 187
Since the confidentiality privilege enjoyed by both judges and witnes-
ses in disciplinary and reappointment proceedings is practically absolute,
Congress does not have ready access to the Commission's files for its
deliberation.188 Yet, if the Senate can predicate floor debate and vote on
the revelation of confidential records, its members will be able to evade
the protections which Congress itself accorded the District's judges.
Certainly the Senate should make informed decisions when contem-
plating Presidential appointments. But the Commission's disciplinary
functions and the Senate's advice and consent duties should not be
184. Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 1977, § B, at 7, col. 3.
185. Wash. Post, May 21, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 3. The Post article insinuated that Carter
had refused the nomination based on additional communication with the Commission: "It
is understood that the White House has been recently informed by the local judicial tenure
commission that the panel had secretly criticized Halleck's conduct on the bench in the
last year." Id.
186. Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1976, § D, at 2, col. 5; Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1976, § A, at I,
col. 1.
187. See note 171 supra.
188. Neither the identity of the witness or judge nor any material connected with a
disciplinary action will be disclosed unless needed for a subsequent appeal from a
Commission Order, or for the prosecution of a witness for perjury. D.C. Code § 11-1528
(1973); 22 D.C. Reg. 2199, 2209-10 (Nov. 4, 1975); see note 162 supra. The prohibition
which applies to reappointment evaluations does not extend to the President:
The identity of any person furnishing information to the Commission will not be
disclosed to anyone, including the judge, unless such person agrees to such
disclosure, nor will the substance of any such information be revealed to anyone
other than the judge or counsel for the judge, except as may be set forth in the
Commission report to the President. However, should the President request that
the Commission divulge to him, or his designated representative, the identity of
such person or the substantive information, the Commission may do so after it
has submitted its report to the President.
22 D.C. Reg. 6441, 6445-46 (May 19, 1976).
[Vol. 27:543
19781 Judicial Tenure
confused. If this practice persists, it is conceivable that a judge might be
denied reappointment for conduct which only merits a reprimand. Argu-
ably, Senator McClellan's tactics prejudiced Judge Halleck's renomina-
tion, interfered with the disciplinary proceeding, and virtually rendered
the outcome moot. 189
This dilemma evolved because the Commission's inquiry was pub-
licized. 190 To forestall similar situations from occurring, the Commission
must strictly enforce its confidentiality rule. Criminal penalties in the
form of fines and imprisonment could be imposed on participants who do
not observe the regulations. 191 Although these sanctions might not elimi-
nate all breaches of the Commission's rules, they should serve to deter
the disclosure of confidential information.
189. Actually, if Judge Halleck's accusations are true, Senator McClellan and the
United States Attorney's office abused the Commission's regulations since all the partici-
pants were aware the proceeding was supposed to be secret. The following passage
appeared in a motion which Judge Halleck filed in conjunction with his lawsuit:
On June 9, 1976, when the Commission received the complaint from Assistant
United States Attorney Mueller, the Commission knew full well that the major
source of opposition to Judge Halleck's reappointment to the Superior Court
bench was the Office of the United States Attorney. According to the testimony
of its special counsel upon trial of this case, the Commission had known since
March, 1976, and of course knew on June 9 when the Mueller complaint was
received, that the Office of the United States Attorney had sealed an agreement
with one Paul Summit, a member of the staff of Senator John McClellan, then
leading senatorial opponent of Judge Halleck's reappointment, to inform Summit
of any inquiries from the Commission to the United States Attorney's office
concerning Judge Halleck's reappointment. And the Commission, which is not
composed of men of uncommon naivete, must have fully realized that the pur-
pose of this arrangement was to use any such Commission inquiries as a device to
justify blockage of Senate action on Judge Halleck's reappointment.
Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen and Receive Additional Evidence at 4-5, Halleck v. Berliner,
427 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1977).
190. More recently, the Post disclosed the existence of a pending disciplinary investi-
gation regarding Judge Robert H. Campbell of the District of Columbia Superior Court.
Wash. Post., April 12, 1978, § A at 1, col. i. Although Judge Campbell is not facing
reappointment, a premature exposure of the Commission's inquiry might unjustly damage
the judge's reputation or impede the Commission's efforts. See notes 41-47 and accom-
panying text supra.
191. A recent Supreme Court decision, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
46 U.S.L.W. 4389 (May 1, 1978), is inapposite to this recommendation. In Landmark, the
Court reversed the Virginia Supreme Court's determination that, pursuant to Va. Code §
2.137.13 (1950), criminal penalties could be levied against third parties, unconnected with
confidential proceedings before the state's Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, who
accurately reported on Commission activities. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens concluded that the interests ad-
vocated by the state did not counterbalance the infringement on free speech rights
imposed by the statute. But see note 162 supra. The District of Columbia sanctions
outlined above, however, apply to Commissioners, staff, members, and other persons
affiliated with the Commission proceedings. The Court's opinion in Landmark does not
prohibit the prosecution of people involved in the Commission's functions. The Court also
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VI. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of judicial tenure agencies over the past eighteen
years reflects a legislative effort to reconcile the supervision of judicial
misconduct with the concept of judicial independence. Generally, the
state plans provide more efficient and flexible alternatives to the tradi-
tional methods of disciplining judges.
The District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and
Tenure possesses considerable responsibility and power. Although the
Tenure Commission has many of the characteristics believed necessary
for an effective disciplinary body, it is still too early to predict its
success. However, certain flaws, including the ambiguity of the
Commission's exact authority and the absence of any means to enforce
the privilege provisions, threaten to restrict its potential. While the
Tenure Commission is regarded as an integral element of home rule, its
status will not be fully realized until these problems are remedied.
Martha J. Tomich
indicated that a similar construction of the Virginia statute "might well save the statute
from constitutional invalidity .. " 46 U.S.L.W. at 4391.
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